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I. INTRODUCTION
It’s recently become fashionable to study the intersection of
international and constitutional law. For scholars of domestic
constitutions, the rise of globalization, the trend toward democratic
governance, and the creation of a robust case law by international
tribunals have magnified the attractions of comparative constitutional
inquiry. The study of foreign and international exemplars provides a
source for domestic innovation and a window through which to view
one’s own constitutional heritage refracted through a lens of
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difference.1 The use of foreign and international law as sources for
constitutional drafting by legislators or interpretation by judges is
often contested. But a comparative gaze can, at a minimum, reveal
paths not taken and arguments not advanced at home, even if the
comparison ultimately leads to a reaffirmation of domestic first
principles.2
For scholars of international law, the appeal of constitutions and
the discourse of constitutionalism has a much more urgent character,
one driven by major changes to the international legal system.
International agreements and institutions are proliferating rapidly,
driven by a recognition that the problems governments now
confront—environmental degradation, security threats, economic
growth, human rights, and many others—can no longer be addressed
by the exercise of authority confined within increasingly porous
national borders.3 As intergovernmental cooperation has become
essential to national and global well-being, states have found it
necessary to pool or limit their sovereignty, drafting treaties that set
out rules for their collaborative endeavors and create institutions to
1. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999) (analyzing constitutional approaches in different
national jurisdictions).
2. Compare, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003)
(holding that state sodomy laws criminalizing sexual conduct between
consenting adults of the same sex violates the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution and citing—as persuasive evidence of “values we
share with a wider civilization”—the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights which held similar laws in Europe to be incompatible with the
right of privacy), with id. at 2495 (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign
views . . . is . . . meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since ‘this
Court[] . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans.’”) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990,
990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Laurence R. Helfer, Not
Leading the World but Following It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003, at A25
(stating that the United States has fallen behind other countries in protecting
the rights of lesbians and gay men and predicting that the Supreme Court
would take global trends into account in Lawrence).
3. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999)
(discussing the expanding number of international tribunals); Eric Stein,
International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 489, 489 n.2 (2001) (noting that the number of intergovernmental
organizations more than doubled in the last half of the twentieth century).
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help police those rules.4 Many of these treaties and institutions—
what international relations (IR) scholars collectively refer to as
international “regimes”5—now exert significant influence on
domestic law and politics. What legal frameworks are needed to
address this tectonic shift in international relations? Settled doctrines
of international law provide an important starting point, establishing
basic ground rules for the negotiation, interpretation, and termination
of treaties and the responsibility of states for violating their legal
obligations.6 But many of these doctrines were formulated at a time
when international law’s primary focus was mediating the
interactions among sovereign nations whose domestic actions were
largely immune from scrutiny. This focus did not lend itself to deep
comparisons with national legal structures, constitutional or
otherwise. Nor did it accurately reflect the reality of a world in
which governments possess very different material resources,
interests, and political configurations and interact not only with each

4. Contrary to the exaggerated fears (or hopes) of some observers, these
agreements and institutions have not usurped nation states as the principal
actors on the international stage. Rather, they serve state interests by reducing
transactions costs, increasing access to information, monitoring behavior,
mediating disputes, and using incentives and sanctions to induce compliance
with prior commitments. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why
States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 3, 8 (1998); William J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and
International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 243–56
(1997). The only plausible exception has occurred in Europe, where the
agreements and institutions of the European Union have progressed to a hybrid
“supranational” status that lies midway between a classical intergovernmental
institution and a full-fledged federal system. See infra Part II.
5. The canonical (if sometimes criticized) definition of regimes are “sets
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international
relations.”
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables 1, 2, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); see also Stephan Haggard & Beth A.
Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT’L ORG. 491, 493–96
(1987) (discussing three definitions of regimes).
6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION,
TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (James Crawford ed., 2002).
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other but with private individuals and civic networks operating
within and across national borders.
Precisely because international rules and institutions are now
more pervasive, more consequential, and penetrate further into
domestic affairs, they raise normative and conceptual challenges that
international lawyers of an earlier age were not forced to confront.
As a preliminary example, consider the legitimacy of a state’s
compliance with its treaty commitments. The law of treaties
addresses legitimacy by specifying the formal indicia of a state’s
consent to a treaty, such as the signature and ratification of the
authoritative text by a government official with power to bind her
government.7 Once these rules of adherence have been followed,
compliance is a straightforward matter.8 The principle of pacta sunt
servanda (treaty commitments must be obeyed) compels the state to
adhere to its obligations.9
Because those obligations were
undertaken with the state’s consent, the reasoning goes, no
legitimacy concerns arise.10
But consider what lies beneath the surface of this narrative. It
assumes that treaty obligations, once undertaken, remain static. In
fact, governments often leave agreements imprecise or incomplete, to
be clarified and augmented by later state practice.11 The narrative
7. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6-16, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334–36.
8. One narrow exception is rebus sic stantibus, a doctrine that permits a
state, within carefully prescribed limits, to invoke changed circumstances as a
justification for failing to adhere to the state’s prior treaty obligations. See
Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347 (setting forth
the doctrine and its limitations). For an insightful discussion of the history of
the doctrine and its tension with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, see
David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1988).
9. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (“Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.”).
10. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
596, 597 (1999) (“In international law, the strongly consensualist basis of
obligation has tended to moot the issue of legitimacy.”).
11. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (explaining advantages
and disadvantages of using binding and nonbinding commitments and
objectives to structure international relations among states); Joel P. Trachtman,
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also ignores the role of international institutions, many of which are
granted the authority to monitor behavior, settle disputes among
treaty parties, interpret ambiguous texts, and develop new hard and
soft law norms.12 Where treaty obligations are dynamic and evolve
through institutional processes outside of any one state’s control,
compliance with those obligations may clash with domestic
preferences and raise trenchant legitimacy concerns. The formal
rules of state consent to treaties do little to ameliorate these concerns,
suggesting the need for alternative sources of legitimacy to support
adherence to international agreements and institutions.13
The foregoing example illustrates how the maturation of the
international legal system is challenging settled doctrines and
prompting scholars to assess the system from fresh perspectives.
One such perspective is to view international rules and institutions
through the lens of constitutionalism.14 On first inspection, the
parallels between international and constitutional law seem both
numerous and compelling: Which international norms, for example,
should be granted the status of higher law and given a privileged
place above ordinary legal rules? What is the appropriate balance of
power among international institutions, such as the lawmaking and
adjudicative arms of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the
many agencies of the United Nations (UN)? When should those
institutions defer to the decisions of other actors in the system, such

The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999)
(arguing that states may deliberately choose to leave treaty texts incomplete to
be filled in by subsequent international adjudication).
12. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 4, at 8. For a recent example of an
intergovernmental organization being granted new authority, see Lawrence K.
Altman, W.H.O. Expected to Gain Broader Powers, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
2003, at A11.
13. For a more detailed discussion of democracy and legitimacy, see infra
Part VII.
14. See, e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, CONSTITUTIONALIZING GLOBALIZATION:
THE POSTMODERN REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL AGREEMENTS (1998); ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1991); see also Deborah Z.
Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial NormGeneration as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40–41, 40 n.3 (2001) (discussing different
meanings of “constitutionalization” by a variety of commentators).
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as national courts, parliaments, or executive officials? And to what
extent should autonomous international tribunals exercise their
limited authority to hold states to their treaty bargains when those
bargains run counter to immediate political pressures?
These questions are remarkably similar to those posed by
constitutional law scholars, and they suggest fruitful areas of
scholarly inquiry. But conceptualizing the international legal system
in constitutional terms is not without pitfalls. It requires more than
merely identifying successful domestic constitutional responses and
transposing them mutatis mutandis to international governance
structures. The many profound differences between domestic and
international legal systems—including not least the lack of a global
polity to authorize the creation of constitutional norms and structures
above the level of the nation state—require a more careful and
guarded appraisal.
Bearing these caveats in mind, in the remainder of this Article I
consider constitutional analogies in greater detail. In particular, I
review five key structural and systemic challenges that the
international legal system now faces: (1) decentralization and
disaggregation; (2) normative and institutional hierarchies; (3)
compliance and enforcement; (4) exit and escape; and (5) democracy
and legitimacy. Each of these five issues raises questions of
governance, institutional design, and allocation of authority, many of
which are comparable to questions that domestic legal systems have
answered through constitutions. For each issue, I survey the
international legal landscape and consider the salience of potential
analogies to domestic constitutions, drawing upon and extending the
writings of international legal scholars and international relations
theorists.
My objectives are deliberately modest. I do not intend to offer
prescriptions for reforming international agreements or
intergovernmental organizations along constitutional lines. Rather, I
offer some preliminary thoughts about why some treaties and
institutions, but not others, more readily lend themselves to analysis
in constitutional terms. I also hope to distinguish those legal and
political issues that may generate useful insights for scholars
studying the growing intersections of international and constitutional
law from other areas that may be more resistant to constitutional
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comparisons. Before turning to a point by point discussion of the
five structural and systemic issues, I begin with a brief historical
overview of two treaty-based intergovernmental organizations that
have evolved to most closely resemble domestic constitutional
systems.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNINGS: FROM THE EU TO THE WTO
The story behind the recent turn to constitutional discourse in
international affairs began in Europe in the middle of the last
century. The institutions of the European Community (now the
European Union, or EU) were created by the Treaty of Rome, an
international agreement among six Western European countries that
resembled many other multilateral treaties negotiated among
sovereign nation states.15 Over a few short decades, these European
institutions transformed the treaty—and themselves—into something
far different. As is now well known, the EU evolved into a quasifederal system with legislative, judicial, and executive branches that
exercise significant lawmaking, adjudicative, and enforcement
powers over first six, then fifteen, and now twenty-five European
member states.16
The ambitious architect of this transformation was the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).17 The judges on the court understood that
their rulings would have little impact if their docket was limited to
occasional disputes between member states. To avoid falling into
obscurity, the court took advantage of a little known provision in the
Treaty of Rome allowing national courts to refer cases to the ECJ for
15. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]; see J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
16. See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism
and its Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354, 356 (1996–1997)
(discussing the shift of the European Community “from a legal order founded
by international treaties negotiated by the governments of states under
international law and giving birth to an international organization, to a
Community which has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were
not a treaty governed by international law but . . . a constitutional charter
governed by a form of constitutional law.”).
17. For a more detailed discussion of the ECJ, see Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 290–93 (1997).
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a preliminary ruling on European Community law. When domestic
judges began to refer cases, the court used a teleological method of
treaty interpretation18 to proclaim the doctrines of direct effect,
supremacy, preemption, and implied powers.19 These doctrines—
which have direct analogues in domestic constitutional
jurisprudence—bolstered the authority of the European Community’s
legislative and executive arms and made the ECJ’s own judgments
nearly as effective as those of national courts.20 In short order, both
the court and the scholars and lawyers who had observed its
evolution proclaimed that the Treaty of Rome was now “the basic
constitutional charter” of the European Community.21 By 2002, this
remarkable trajectory had accelerated to the point where delegates
from all of the EU’s member states were debating a new Convention
on the Future of Europe, a document that many observers hoped
would “replace the EU’s complex web of constitutive treaties with a
definitive constitution.”22
Could this “constitutionalization” of international law and
institutions be replicated elsewhere? The prospects for successful
imitation at first seemed bleak. International courts and tribunals,

18. The “telos” or goal of the Court’s doctrinal handiwork was to facilitate
the Treaty of Rome’s paramount objective of an “ever closer union” among the
member states. Treaty of Rome, supra note 15, pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14.
19. For a discussion of these doctrines, see Weiler, supra note 15, at 2413–
17.
20. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking:
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 681, 716 (1996–1997)
(“[T]he Court of Justice has both displayed a tendency toward selfaggrandizement and has supported an expansion of the authority of the EU
organs at the expense of national lawmaking authority.”).
21. See Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339, 1365
(describing the Treaty of Rome as “the basic constitutional charter” of the
Community); J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 221 (1999) (“The constitutionalism thesis claims that in critical
aspects the [European] Community has evolved and behaves as if its founding
instrument were not a treaty governed by international law but, to use the
language of the European Court, a constitutional charter governed by a form of
constitutional law.”).
22. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European
Union: Some Cautionary Tales From American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1612, 1614 n.3 (2002).
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thought by many observers to be essential for effective constitution
building beyond national borders, were weak and underutilized
outside of Europe. Some were, in truth, only quasi-judicial bodies
that lacked the basic power to issue legally binding decisions and
instead operated entirely by persuasion. Even tribunals that enjoyed
greater formal authority were hobbled by limited jurisdictional
mandates, empty dockets, or narrow subject-matter competencies
that made judicial constitution building a political and practical
impossibility.23
Yet, the powerful example of European
constitutionalism remained, suggesting that “a conventional treaty
regime, once endowed with a judicial mechanism for interpretation
and enforcement, can be converted by degrees to a genuine
constitutional order.”24
The dim prospects for international constitutionalism brightened
in the mid-1990s with the creation of the World Trade
Organization.25 The WTO is the successor to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and incorporates the substantive
obligations of that earlier treaty.26 But the WTO also contains key
institutional innovations that scholars quickly interpreted as
containing the seeds of a proto-constitution. First, the WTO
endorses a legalistic approach to resolving international trade
disputes,27 creating ad hoc dispute settlement panels and a standing
23. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 285–86.
24. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global
Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far 227, 239, in
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227, 239 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY].
25. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa_e.htm [hereinafter Final
Act].
26. The subject matter of the WTO Agreements includes far more than the
tariff and nontariff barriers of the GATT. It also extends to trade in services,
intellectual property, agriculture, and detailed rules concerning government
procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, antidumping, subsidies, and
countervailing duties. Stein, supra note 3, at 500 n.60.
27. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 479–83 (1994); G. Richard
Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833–34 (1995).
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tribunal of trade experts known to hear appeals from panel rulings.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding refers to this tribunal
by the politically palatable euphemism of “Appellate Body.” But it
has been clear from the outset that, whatever its formal appellation,
this judicial dispute settlement institution would function as a de
facto court of international trade. WTO panels and the Appellate
Body have issued dozens of rulings each year in contentious cases
between WTO member states involving high financial stakes and
difficult questions of treaty interpretation that cut to the core of
domestic regulation. WTO jurists, in short, have begun to perform
“functions somewhat like a constitutional court elaborating the
meaning and import of a fairly fixed primary text.”28
Second, in a manner analogous to domestic constitutions, the
WTO treaties have acquired something of the status of higher law—
at least when that law clashes with inconsistent national legislation or
regulations. The system’s robust dispute settlement mechanism
further entrenches the perception that “WTO rules act as a superconstitutional text with a force superior to ordinary national
enactments.”29 After losing before a panel or the Appellate Body,
defending member states are expected to bring their inconsistent
measures into conformity with the treaty. Those that fail to do so
face the threat of authorized retaliation in the form of trade sanctions,
giving all governments—including those of economically powerful
states—a strong incentive to comply.
A third characteristic that buttresses WTO’s incipient
constitutional character is its de facto separation of international
trade from ordinary domestic politics. The organization (like the
GATT before it) was premised on a club model of multilateral
cooperation.30 The members of the club were trade ministers,
initially from a relatively small number of like-minded industrialized
states, who met in closed door sessions and then presented the results
28. Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
451, 458 (2001); see also Cass, supra note 14, at 42–71 (discussing
constitutional functions performed by the WTO Appellate Body).
29. Atik, supra note 28, at 452.
30. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of
Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 24, at 264.
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of their negotiations to largely uninformed and unchallenging
domestic constituencies. This approach facilitated deeper integration
by “limiting the disruptive force of parochial concerns emanating
from domestic politics.”31 But the broader effect was to disengage
trade norms from national political structures and national polities,
transforming the character of the WTO Agreements “from that of a
complex, messy negotiated bargain of diverse rules, principles, and
norms into a single structure” whose elements were far more difficult
to contest.32
Other features of the WTO, however, suggest that these
constitutional attributes are far less entrenched than in the EU. For
one thing, the treaties under the organization’s umbrella do not create
private rights to be given direct effect before domestic courts. Only
member states have rights and obligations under the WTO
agreements.33 In addition, the detailed thicket of trade rules applies
not merely (as in Europe) to a regionally contiguous cluster of
countries with similar economies and levels of industrialization, but
to a truly global association of states whose economies range from
the most to the least developed.34 Having so many issues and so
many nations seated at the bargaining table increases the opportunity
for package deals. But these same features also make it far more
difficult to reach consensus on a set of constitutional meta norms to
govern the organization and its members. Finally, the WTO’s
dispute settlement jurists have adopted a more circumspect
interpretive approach than their European colleagues. Where the
ECJ has used an openly teleological method to forge the support
beams that were missing from the EU’s constitutional frame, the
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have acted as comparatively
31. Id. at 266.
32. Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 228.
33. See WTO Dispute Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of
the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R ¶¶ 7.76-7.78 (Dec. 22, 1999)
(WTO panel stated that, unlike the EU, the WTO had only “indirect effect” on
“individual economic operators” and did not create a new legal order that
comprised both member states and their nationals).
34. See Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the
TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 357, 389–92 (1998) [hereinafter Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright
Claims] (discussing differences in membership between EU and WTO).
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strict constructionists. Taking their cue from the Dispute Settlement
Understanding which prohibits “add[ing] to or diminish[ing] the
rights and obligations” in the treaties,35 the trade jurists have
conceived of their role as enforcers of the bargains negotiated by the
member states rather than as creative builders who can fill in
constitutional gaps in the treaty’s architecture.36
The foregoing discussion reveals that the WTO’s constitutional
attributes are only partial and incomplete. But the cumulative effect
of those features has been sufficient to create a fully functioning and
effective system of international trade. Indeed, so successful is the
WTO as an intergovernmental organization that some commentators
have advocated adding still more international law issues within its
purview—including environmental protection, labor standards, and
human rights—notwithstanding the fact that each of these subjects is
already governed by its own set of treaties and institutions.37 Other
scholars have warned against these incorporation efforts, however,
contending that dyeing these legal issues with a tincture of trade

35. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (the Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, art. 3.2, Annex 2, 33
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
36. See Atik, supra note 28, at 458 (“When common and political sense
might have suggested straying from the text, WTO decisions have often held
close to the letter of the law while expressing reluctance about the holding.”);
Stein, supra note 3, at 502 (“There is no indication . . . that the dispute
settlement organs will be able or willing to ‘constitutionalize’ the basic [WTO]
agreements in the image of the crucial role that the [ECJ] has played in
European integration.”). But see John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of
Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL L. REV.
(forthcoming Winter 2004, manuscript at 51–80, on file with author).
37. For discussions of the merits and demerits of incorporating each of
these issue areas into the WTO, see Robert Howse, The World Trade
Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 131, 134–35 (1999); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade
Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the
WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 84–90 (2001); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an
Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to
the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 40–45
(1996).
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would leave an indelible stain.38 Many WTO members themselves
have protested the linkage to non-trade issues, arguing that it would
give unfair economic advantages to some nations (mainly wealthy
industrialized ones) at the expense of others (mainly poorer
developing countries). But the very fact that governments and
observers are giving vent to such expansionist proposals reveals the
degree to which the WTO has, in only a few short years,
demonstrated its present efficacy and its future potential to evolve
into an international institution with aspirations to constitutional
authority.39
III. DECENTRALIZATION AND DISAGGREGATION
Seen from the perspective of encouraging states to comply with
their treaty obligations, the EU and the WTO are unadulterated
success stories. But it would be wrong for readers unfamiliar with
international politics to conclude that these intergovernmental
organizations are representative of the international legal system as a
whole. Quite to the contrary, these two institutions are exceptional
cases and for that reason are often viewed with envy by lawyers and
scholars whose work focuses on weaker or less effective
international regimes or treaties with poor compliance records.40

38. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 733, 756 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, The WTO and Global Governance:
The Case for Contractual Treaty Regimes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 109, 128–
31 (2001).
39. See Daniel C. Esty, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
LEGITIMACY, supra note 24, at 301, 304 (referring to the failed attempt to
launch the Millennium Round of trade negotiations in Seattle in 1999 as “the
opening of a Global Constitutional Convention” that will “involve decades or
even centuries of discussions and refinements”).
40. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums
of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 1 (2001) (“Whatever
its flaws, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the envy of international
lawyers who are more familiar with less efficient and more complianceresistant legal regimes, including those within the International Labor
Organization (ILO), United Nations (UN) human rights bodies, and other
adjudicative arrangements such as the World Court or the ad hoc war crimes
tribunals.”).
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Anarchy is the principal reason why robust international
institutions and governance structures have been slow to develop.41
There is no single legislative, executive, or judicial body with
mandatory, universal authority over all subjects denominated as
“international,” in the way that a national parliament can regulate all
aspects of domestic law.42 A few important institutions, such as the
UN Charter and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are
empowered to resolve a broad range of controversies. But even these
entities are significantly limited when compared to domestic
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies.43
In the absence of a centralized, hierarchical authority with the
power to coerce behavior, nation states are free to pursue their own
interests, with states that possess more material or financial resources
often enjoying a decided advantage in their relations with weaker or
poorer countries.44 But operating under anarchic conditions is costly,
time consuming, and inefficient, even for powerful states. These
negative byproducts of anarchy create incentives for states to achieve
more productive outcomes by negotiating treaties and participating in
international governance structures. Yet, because the incentive to
cooperate varies with factors such as information asymmetries,
power imbalances, differentiated applicability rules, and the nature of

41. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation
Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 226 (1985); JACK
DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9 (2000).
42. See José E. Alvarez, Constitutional Interpretation in International
Organizations 104, 106–07, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
43. In the case of the ICJ, a state must expressly consent to the Court’s
jurisdiction. In the absence of such consent, the Court has no power to hear a
dispute. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY 30 (1999). The authority of the United Nations is broader, but still
does not reach all nations or all legal issues. See Elizabeth Olson, Slim Edge
Mars Vote by Swiss To Join U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at A8. In
addition, the Charter contains important subject-matter carve-outs, such as the
domestic jurisdiction exclusion in Article 2(7), although these have eroded
significantly over time. See Alvarez, supra note 42, at 107.
44. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1789, 1793–96 (2003) (discussing the importance of anarchy and power
in international politics).
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the underlying problem to be resolved,45 no one mode of
cooperation, institutional format, or even type of law has
predominated.46
The result is a disaggregated and decentralized international
legal system,47 comprised of a hodge podge of rules and institutions
that includes tens of thousands of multilateral, regional, and bilateral
treaties;48 myriad nonbinding soft law norms; intergovernmental
organizations; standard setting bodies; courts, tribunals and arbitral
panels; and formal and informal government, private, and hybrid
networks.49 To the uninitiated, the number and diversity of these
45. Id. at 1797–98 (discussing “difficulties associated with ‘prisoner’s
dilemmas’ (especially the risk of cheating), coordination problems,
asymmetrical information, transaction costs, free riding, the ‘tragedy of the
commons,’ and other challenges to collective action”); Kal Raustiala,
Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 407 (2000)
(identifying instances where international environmental agreements impose
“differential regulatory obligations” on developed and developing states).
46. The term “international” is inadequate to convey the richness and
complexity of the legal rules and structures now operating outside or alongside
of national legal systems, prompting observers to coin such terms as
“supranational,” “anational,” and “non-national.” See Laurence R. Helfer &
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
141, 145 (2001).
47. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 288, 301 (1999) (using these terms to describe the international human
rights petition system) [hereinafter Helfer, Forum Shopping].
48. See
United
Nations
Treaty
Collection:
Overview,
at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/overview.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003)
(stating that the United Nations Treaty Series, a collection of international
agreements registered or recorded with the UN Secretariat since 1946, contains
over 50,000 treaties).
49. See, e.g., Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 46, at 144–45 nn. 1–5 (“The
number of [lawmaking and dispute settlement] institutions operating outside
the confines of national borders have become more numerous and
heterogeneous in the last decades of the twentieth century. Indeed, their growth
appears exponential.”); Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the
International System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NONBINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 22, 25–31 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000) (discussing different forms of soft law); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and
Disaggregated Democracy at 2–3 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L., Working Paper No.
018, 2001 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=283976 (discussing
government networks)).
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entities may seem nothing short of overwhelming. It is possible,
however, to discern a degree of order amid the chaos created by such
multiplicity.
To start with, a distinct set of treaties, organizations, and dispute
settlement procedures generally governs each substantive issue
area—such as the environment, human rights, trade, arms control,
etc. With only a few exceptions,50 discussed in greater detail below,
the entities that operate in one issue area have no formal competence
over other issue areas. To illustrate, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) does not have the authority to consider violations of
trade or environmental agreements, even by states parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights whose civil liberties records
the court does scrutinize. Often, the division of competence is even
narrower, with an entity empowered to address only one among
many treaties within a single issue area. The ECHR, to continue the
above example, cannot rule on whether a state party to the European
Convention has violated other human rights agreements it has
ratified, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, even though many obligations in the two treaties are virtually
identical.51
In practice, of course, the lines of demarcation are not always so
sharply etched. National land use regulations may raise human
rights concerns as well as environmental ones, just as trade policies
may implicate labor issues. Formal jurisdictional boundaries do not
bar institutions of limited competence from addressing such spillover
effects. Nor do they prevent international bureaucrats or jurists from
considering “external” rules and norms in deciding how to interpret
50. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is authorized to give
advisory opinions interpreting “other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states.” “Other Treaties” Subject to the
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24,
1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 12, 16 OEA/Ser.L/V/III,9, doc. 13 (1983). The
proposed (but not yet operational) African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights will have jurisdiction to hear petitions by individuals alleging violations
of any human rights treaty. See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights
Court: A Two-Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342, 354 (1999) (discussing the
extent of the court’s jurisdiction).
51. See Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 301–04 (describing
typology of similarities and differences among human rights treaties).
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treaty texts that do fall within their purview.52 These are important
caveats. But they do not detract from the dominant systemic theme
of multiple institutions, each working independently of the others to
articulate a relatively constrained set of legal norms.
What are the consequences of decentralization and
disaggregation for analyzing international law and international
institutions from a constitutional perspective? Many domestic
constitutions require a balancing or a sharing of power among
different governmental authorities, both vertically (between national
and local power, for example) and horizontally (such as between
national legislative and judicial power). This division of authority
among governmental actors provides an intrinsic check against abuse
of power. It also allows certain issues to be devolved to decision
makers who have better expertise or are closer to the polities affected
by their decisions. And it creates opportunities for regulatory
experimentation, diversity, and competition within a single national
jurisdiction.
The decentralized international legal system raises similar
issues, both with respect to vertical and horizontal allocations of
power. In terms of vertical power dynamics, decentralization and
disaggregation create the need for rules of relation between
international agreements and institutions on the one hand, and
domestic legal systems on the other. Those rules can be plotted
along a continuum that, at one extreme, grants absolute deference to
states and the decisions of their governments and, at the other, gives
international bodies the right to review domestic decisions de novo
and to supplant them whenever they are inconsistent with a state’s
treaty commitments.53 In between these two polestars lie various
52. For two examples of such interpretive maneuvers, see Report of the
Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, 1998 WL 720123
(WTO) (construing GATT in light of international environmental law) and
Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (construing European
Convention on Human Rights in light of International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
53. Compare Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in
National Security, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 326–30 (1998) (discussing
national security exception in Article XXI of GATT which purportedly grants
states the right to “self-judg[e]” whether the exception should be applied) with
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gradations of international sensitivity to domestic actors and their
actions, which appear under such headings as subsidiarity,
complementarity, and margin of appreciation.54 As the subjects that
treaties regulate have become more complex, it is increasingly
common for a single treaty or treaty system to specify different
degrees of deference for different substantive or procedural issues.55
Whatever rules of relation a particular treaty regime adopts, the
critical issue will be drawing lines that separate international from
domestic decision making powers. Who, for example, determines
whether a particular subject or dispute falls within the authority of
international as opposed to domestic actors? In practice, the entity
that answers this “[k]ompetenz-[k]ompetenz” question (that is, the
competence to determine one’s own competence) enjoys
considerable power both to police and to revise jurisdictional
boundaries in ways that enhance its own authority.56
Decentralization and disaggregation also raise important
horizontal power allocation issues. The horizontal division of
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 35, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 120
(requiring WTO panels to make “an objective assessment” of the facts and
relevant treaty articles when hearing disputes between WTO members). See
also Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 227, 243 (advocating “strict
scrutiny of national compliance with general trade regime norms such as
nondiscrimination, and especially procedural norms such as transparency and
due process”).
54. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of
International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40–46 (2003);
Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of
Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal
Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 450–66 (2001); Mohamed M. El
Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 870 (2002).
55. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L
L. 193, 198–201 (1996) (analyzing deferential standards of review for antidumping and countervailing duty measures under the GATT 1994 and
comparing them to standards of review in other WTO Agreements); see also
Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 34, at 412–39 (proposing
that WTO dispute settlement jurists adopt a graduated continuum of deference
to domestic decision makers under the copyright provisions of the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
56. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 305 n.128 (discussing
kompetenz-kompetenz disputes between ECJ and national courts in Europe).
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authority among international institutions was traditionally conceived
along functional lines.57 Each institution was granted control
(subject to the ultimate authority of its member states) over a specific
set of issues and tasks in a way that generally excluded the
competence of other institutions. Although the ICJ recently
reaffirmed this approach,58 pure functionalism no longer accurately
describes most forms of international lawmaking and adjudication.
A more accurate assessment recognizes that the proliferation of
institutions and the blurring of issue area boundaries have enabled
different decision makers to address similar issues in distinct
international fora.59
Unlike the relationships among power holders in domestic
constitutional systems, however, the relationships among
international institutions with overlapping competencies are rarely
formally specified. This de facto laissez faire approach has both
virtues and vices. On the benefit side, it allows different institutions
to act as laboratories, experimenting with alternative approaches to
resolving the same legal problems.60 Experimentation may also lead
actors to share information and compare results, creating formal and
informal dialogues that enrich the conversation about the pathways
along which cooperative solutions might evolve. A multiplicity of
venues also allows certain institutions to develop specialized
expertise that may, in turn, attract claims from private parties and
create additional opportunities to press states to comply with their
57. See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 48 (2002) (discussing history of functionalism).
58. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
Advisory Op., 1996 ICJ Rep. 66 ¶ 26 (July 8) available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjww/icases/ianw/ianjudgment_advisory%20opinion_10960708/iunan_
ijudgment_19960708_Advisory%opinion.htm (applying the “principle of
specialty” and holding that World Health Organization lacked the competence
to question the legality of using nuclear weapons).
59. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon as it applies to
intellectual property rights, see Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime Shifting].
60. Those alternatives may include some organizations that promote
cooperation using soft law and others that generate legally binding
commitments, as well as organizations with greater or lesser degrees of
accessibility to nonstate actors.
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treaty commitments. Finally, granting two or more institutions
shared competence over a particular issue area may engender healthy
inter-organizational rivalries in which institutions curb each other’s
expansive tendencies or compete to provide a superior set of services
to member states and other constituencies.61
The relatively unstructured horizontal relationships among
disaggregated international institutions also have problematic
consequences, however. Dividing lawmaking or dispute settlement
authority over a single issue area may create inefficiencies, needless
duplication or bureaucratization of work, and opportunities for forum
shopping.62 It may also force officials to address discrete (but
interrelated) aspects of a regulatory problem in different venues,
rather than developing a comprehensive solution.63 In addition,
governments may create institutions with overlapping jurisdictions,
not to foster competition or experimentation, but as a safety valve to

61. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade
and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77, 92 (2002) (discussing “[t]he [r]ole of
[i]nterorganizational [c]ompetition”). Such competition may also arise in
response to domestic pressures, for example when states create a new
institution to express their dissatisfaction with the activities of an existing one.
See Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 59, at 14-17 (discussing motivations
for United States and EC to shift intellectual property lawmaking from the
World Intellectual Property Organization to the WTO).
62. In the human rights context, for example, more than a dozen courts,
tribunals, and treaty bodies have been created to receive complaints from
individuals and groups challenging governments’ human rights practices. See
Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 296–98. Several studies have
argued that some or all of these bodies should be consolidated into a single
human rights court or similar institution. See Philip Alston, Effective
Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights
Instruments: Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the
United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Anex,
Agenda Item 15, ¶¶ 14–36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1997); Thomas
Buergenthal, Remarks, The UN Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective?, 91 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 482, 483 (1997). But see Helfer, Forum Shopping,
supra note 47, at 346–60 (defending the use of forum shopping given the
current decentralized nature of the international human rights petition system).
63. See MICHEL PETIT ET AL., WHY GOVERNMENTS CAN’T MAKE POLICY:
THE CASE OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 6
(2002) (lamenting that the “multiplicity of interests and fora, and the existence
of several debates or negotiations taking place simultaneously, can . . . lead to
poorly coordinated, inconsistent, and even contradictory policies”).
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placate the demands of domestic interest groups.64 Finally, a
multiplicity of lawmaking fora creates the possibility of conflicts
among legal norms and allows states to justify their conduct as
sanctioned by one treaty even if that same conduct violates the
prescriptions of another international agreement.65 I assess the risk
of such conflicts and the different approaches to minimize them in
the following section.
IV. NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHIES
In constitutional systems, the controversies raised by horizontal
and vertical divisions of power are often resolved by granting
particular institutions or particular norms a higher order status that
trumps competing institutions or norms within the same system.66
The international legal system too contains normative and
institutional hierarchies that, upon initial inspection, seem to offer a
tool for resolving the difficulties that decentralization and
disaggregation may engender. As I explain below, however, these
hierarchies do not (at least in their present form) provide a blueprint
for resolving questions of governance in a manner analogous to the
hierarchies enshrined in domestic constitutions.
Consider first the body of rules known to international lawyers
as jus cogens or peremptory norms. These are an evolving set of
legal norms acknowledged by states to have attained the status of
“higher” international law from which no derogation is permitted.67
64. Governments may find it advantageous, for example, to address the
intersection between trade and labor issues not in the WTO, where treaty
commitments are made meaningful through a robust dispute settlement system,
but in the ILO whose rules and dispute settlement institutions are much
weaker. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 567 (2000).
65. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law:
Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J.
675, 699 (1993) (noting the inefficiencies created by “overlapping provisions
in agreements, inconsistencies in obligations, significant gaps in coverage, and
duplication of goals and responsibilities”).
66. This is not to suggest that such institutions or norms necessary remain
constant over time, nor that their placement precludes domestic actors from
contesting their primacy.
67. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir.) (en
banc) (“[J]us cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all
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Indeed, so strong is the normative force of jus cogens that any treaty
that conflicts with them is simply void.68
In theory, the existence of jus cogens provides a basis for a
normative ordering of the international legal system. In practice,
only a very narrow list of rules has thus far achieved this elevated
status. Other than a ban on unauthorized uses of force, peremptory
norms concern the most serious human rights abuses, such as slavery
and slave trading, genocide, extrajudicial killing, forced
disappearances, torture, degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination.69
These are unquestionably egregious acts. But they are a far more
circumscribed list than the catalog of individual liberties given pride
of place in many domestic constitutions (and in human rights law
generally). Nor, more importantly, do these norms provide an
adequate foundation for resolving the most pressing power sharing
and conflicts issues that the international legal system now faces.
They offer no guidance for resolving competency disputes among
international lawmaking institutions, nor do they constrain decision
makers to follow precepts that are often considered hallmarks of
legitimate governance, such as adherence to the rule of law, due
process, transparency, and non-discrimination.
Recognizing such inadequacies, some commentators have
attempted to expand the list of jus cogens to include all human
rights70 or, alternatively, to embrace the core values of international
nations and is derived from values taken to be fundamental by the international
community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested choices of
nations.”), cert. granted sub. nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 807
(2003).
68. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining
peremptory norms).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987) (stating that “[n]ot all human rights norms
are peremptory norms (jus cogens)” but including rights listed in the text as
having attained that elevated status).
70. See, e.g., Warren Allmand, The Primacy of Human Rights in
International Law, at http://serveur.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization/globalAllmandTechnical.html (last visited September 2, 2003)
(asserting the “primacy of human rights obligations” over other rules of
international law); Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights
in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization 5 (Int’l
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economic law.71 Both arguments are contested and controversial,
however, suggesting that, whatever their substantive merits, these
claims should be regarded as pathways along which the international
legal system might evolve, rather than accurate statements of existing
positive law.
What hierarchical orderings are possible in the absence of a
comprehensive body of peremptory norms? One possibility is found
in Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that “[i]n the event of
a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.”72 This “UN supremacy clause” might be seen
as granting the UN an institutional primacy over other
intergovernmental organizations. Indeed, commentators have used
Article 103 in precisely this way, arguing that “the aims and
purposes of the UN, [including] maintenance of peace and security,
and the promotion and protection of human rights, constitute an
international public order to which other treaty regimes must
conform.”73
In practice, however, Article 103 has been given a narrow
construction that emphasizes the preeminence of specific Security
Centre for Human Rts. & Democratic Dev., Policy Paper, 2000) (“In the event
of a conflict between a universally recognized human right and a commitment
ensuing from international treaty law such as a trade agreement, the latter must
be interpreted to be consistent with the former.”).
71. The foremost proponent of this approach is Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.
See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic
Law in the 21st Century: the Need to Clarify their Interrelationships, 4 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 3 (2001); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and
Human Rights, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19 (2000).
72. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, art. 103, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). Other international agreements
often acknowledge the Charter’s supremacy. See, e.g., General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 266, art. XXI(c) (stating
that nothing in GATT shall be construed “to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security”).
73. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 304 (2002); see also Bardo Fassbender, The
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998).

HELFER_PRINTER READY (022804)

216

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

8/2/2004 3:08 PM

[Vol. 37:193

Council resolutions over inconsistent treaty obligations.74 Broader
efforts to bootstrap the entire corpus of human rights law or other
international rules to a position of primacy under the Charter have
been met with considerable skepticism. The reason for this is clear
enough: although Article 103 specifies that the Charter’s obligations
trump other treaty commitments, its open-ended text does not specify
with any degree of precision which norms are entitled to that higher
order status.75 That interpretive task remains to be developed by UN
institutions and by the discursive practices of its member states.
Yet another potential candidate for international hierarchy is
found in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
entitled “Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the Same
Subject-Matter.”76 Article 30 sets out a series of default rules to
determine which of two treaties negotiated at different points in time
is to be given effect in the event of a conflict between them.77 By
providing a mechanism to reconcile seemingly inconsistent treaty
commitments, Article 30 would seem to fill a critical void in a
decentralized, disaggregated legal system whose treaty population is
becoming increasingly dense. Sadly, the conflicts rules that Article

74. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.;
Libya v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 3, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilus/ilus_isummaries/ilus_19920414.htm
(invoking
Article 103 to uphold UN Security Council resolution imposing sanctions
against Libya in the face of conflicting treaty obligations). See also Alvarez,
supra note 40, at 7 (emphasizing that Article 103 has been authoritatively
interpreted to address only the “relatively narrow” issue of the authority of
certain UN organs “to override pre-existing treaty obligations and to instruct
U.N. members to do likewise”).
75. See Alvarez, supra note 40, at 7 (“Article 103 does not say which
customary international law obligations are to be given privileged status as
U.N. Charter obligations”); see also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute
Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753, 798 n.140 (2002)
(critiquing claim by Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de
l’Homme, ‘Rapport l’OMC et les droits de l’homme’ No. 320 (Nov. 2001),
that Article 103 gives primacy to all human rights obligations over other treaty
commitments).
76. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 30, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339–40.
77. The provisions of Article 30 are “default rules” because governments
are free to opt-out of them and include different conflicts rules in the treaties
they negotiate. Id. art. 30(2).
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30 endorses are far from clear and have engendered confusion rather
than certainty.
Consider first the scope of Article 30, which applies only to
“successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter.”78
Determining whether the subject matter of two international
agreements is the same is hardly a straightforward exercise. Are two
treaties that seek to preserve different aspects of the global
environment the same, or must the subject matter nexus be tighter?
The drafting history of the Vienna Convention provides minimal
insight, and authoritative commentary offers little more, merely
stating that the clause should be “construed strictly” and should
exclude “cases where a general treaty impinges indirectly on the
content of a particular provision of an earlier treaty.”79 If two
international agreements do not share the same subject matter,
Article 30’s conflicts rules simply do not apply, leaving states with
little guidance over how to reconcile their inconsistent treaty
commitments.
The difficulties only deepen where two treaties are related.
Assuming that all of the states parties to both treaties are the same
(or that the states parties differ but a dispute arises between states
that have ratified both agreements), Article 30 adopts a rule of lex
posterior, directing that the later treaty is to be applied to the extent
of any conflict with the earlier one.80 If, however, only one of the
disputing states has ratified both treaties, precisely the opposite rule
(lex prior) applies. The earlier agreement governs since that is the
only text to which both disputing states have agreed to be bound.
Both of these temporal rule choices are problematic. Lex
posterior relieves states of the impossibility of complying with
inconsistent international commands, but does so by mechanically
applying the latter agreement without considering the treaties’
underlying substantive values. It thus “takes account neither of the
78. Id. art. 30(1).
79. SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 98 (2d ed. 1984).
80. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 30(3), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339
(“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty . . .
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible
with those of the later treaty.”).
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issues actually involved in [a] conflict nor of the interests evident (or
not evident) in both treaty regimes in having their respective rules
applied.”81 Article 30 also endorses the proposition that more recent
treaties are normatively superior to older ones, a claim belied by the
realities of present day international lawmaking in which new
agreements reach back into the past to link up with earlier ones and
forward into the future as they are augmented and revised over
time.82 The lex prior rule is even more troublesome. It suffers from
the same flaws as its cousin, but in addition it leaves the state that
has ratified two inconsistent agreements with no guidance as to how
to reconcile that conflict.83 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that
commentators have dubbed Article 30 “an entirely unsatisfactory
response” to the problem of conflicting treaties.84
States have responded to these inadequacies by opting-out of the
Vienna Convention, drafting treaty-specific conflicts rules to mediate
the relationship among international agreements. Most often, these
rules take the form of “savings clauses” which clarify that the
provisions of one treaty do not prejudice or otherwise undermine the
obligations of some other agreement.85 Although this contracting

81. Gregory H. Fox, International Organizations: Conflicts of International
Law, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 183, 186 (2001).
82. See J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why
Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 763, 765 (1995) (discussing the “backward-looking character” of the
TRIPs Agreement); Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and
the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 912–13 (1996)
(discussing procedures for adoption of protocols to environmental law treaties
and the difficulties they create under Vienna Convention Article 30).
83. See Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article
XX of GATT and the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) (Article 30 “provides no practical guidance on
how the country that is a party to both treaties is to reconcile conflicting legal
obligations.”).
84. Fox, supra note 81, at 185 (paraphrasing SINCLAIR, supra note 79, at
98).
85. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 60, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 250
[hereinafter European Convention] (“Nothing in this Convention shall be
construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.”).
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around Article 30’s default rule is eminently sensible, deciding
which treaty rules enjoy priority in the event of a conflict is often
highly contested. In several recent negotiations, states were unable
to agree on clear savings rules and adopted instead a set of
aspirational but ambiguous clauses in the treaties’ preambles, the
legal effect of which has yet to be conclusively determined.86
International tribunals have also mitigated Article 30’s mischief
by narrowly construing the types of inconsistencies that rise to the
level of a conflict. WTO dispute settlement panels, for example,
presume that two treaties relating to the same subject matter are
compatible and can be implemented by a state that has ratified both
agreements. A true conflict exists only where treaty rules are
mutually inconsistent, in the sense that a state’s compliance with one
rule necessarily compels it to violate another.87 Although this
narrow definition avoids Article 30’s problems, it creates
considerable uncertainty about the scope of states’ obligations when
treaties are in tension with each other. A more promising approach
has been followed by tribunals that refuse to hide behind formalistic
rules and instead interpret treaties that straddle subject matter
boundaries by harmonizing the texts, objectives, and values in both
issue areas.88
As this discussion reveals, normative and institutional
hierarchies are as vital to international legal systems as they are to
constitutional ones.
A key difference is that constitutional
hierarchies are generally fixed at the time when the founding
documents are drafted, whereas international law hierarchies are
continually evolving and (often) continually contested. At present,
86. See Sabrina Saffrin, Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and
the World Trade Organization Agreements, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 614–18
(2002).
87. See Panel Report on Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, July 2, 1998, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R &
WT/DS64/R ¶ 14.28 in 7 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT DECISIONS: BERNAN’S ANNOTATED REPORTED 164, 488 (1999)
(“[I]n public international law there is a presumption against conflict.”); see
also id. at 488 n.649 (“[T]here is a conflict when two (or more) treaty
instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with
simultaneously . . . . Incompatibility of contents is an essential condition of
conflict.”).
88. See supra note 52.
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these hierarchies are still in a nascent stage of development that will
require further refinement before they can crystallize into systemwide normative or institutional orderings.
V. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
In most domestic legal systems, particularly rule of law societies
and liberal democracies, the implicit assumption is one of adherence
to legal rules. Affected parties may vigorously oppose new legal
proscriptions through the judicial process, often by testing them
against higher order constitutional norms. And such challenges may
on occasion produce crises of constitutional magnitude in which
tensions flare between different sources of domestic political
authority. But in the large majority of cases, once a rule’s validity
has been conclusively determined, the parties whom it affects know
that the state possesses a variety of tools to sanction noncompliance.
Noncompliance still occurs, of course, but it does so constrained by
the shadow of legal systems that enjoy relatively robust enforcement
powers.
The international legal system is radically different, and for that
reason constitutional analogies are less salient in this area than
elsewhere. Because of underlying power differentials and the dearth
of external coercive authority,89 compliance with treaties and other
international commitments is decidedly not taken as a given. Quite
to the contrary, compliance is a subject of intense examination and
debate by both international lawyers and political scientists.90 An
entire school of IR theory contends that international law is
epiphenomenal—i.e., that it reflects rather than constrains existing
distributions of power among nations.91 Most international legal
89. See supra Part III.
90. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (“[C]ompliance is one of the most central
questions in international law.”). For a comprehensive survey of the
compliance literature, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539–45 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
91. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999)
(“International relations [IR] scholars have traditionally . . . regarded
international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of
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scholars, by contrast, agree with the famous assertion that “almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time.”92 But only recently
have they moved from anecdotal narratives about compliance to case
studies93 and more ambitious empirical projects testing the veracity
of that claim.94
One important explanation for this preoccupation with questions
of compliance is the lack of strong international enforcement
mechanisms. As explained earlier, most treaties lack resilient
judicial oversight. Those few regimes where international tribunals
do have teeth (such as the EU, WTO, and European Convention) are,
not surprisingly, progressing the furthest along the path toward
constitutionalization.95 Outside of the judicial realm, the prospects
for collective enforcement of legal obligations are not much brighter.
The UN Security Council’s sanctioning powers are notoriously weak
and politicized, and regional sanctioning practices are only
marginally better.96

international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by
power-applying States, and therefore of little relevance to how States actually
behave.”).
92. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47
(2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
93. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights:
International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash
Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) [hereinafter
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights].
94. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1940, 1962–2002 (2002) (presenting
extensive quantitative analysis of states’ human rights practices and concluding
that “noncompliance [with treaty obligations] appears [to be] common” and
that “treaty ratification is not infrequently associated with worse . . . human
rights ratings than would otherwise be expected”). For a broad based critique
of this ambitious empirical study and the author’s reply, see Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 171 (2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 185 (2003).
95. See supra Part II.
96. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE
WITH
INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 34–67 (1995) (discussing weak sanctioning mechanisms in
international law).
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In the absence of robust third party enforcement mechanisms,
scholars have sought other explanations for why compliance with
international obligations does or does not occur. One crucial force
favoring compliance is reciprocity—the right of a state adversely
affected by another state’s violation of its commitments to withhold
its own performance under a treaty or customary law.97 The prospect
of such reciprocal noncompliance is a form of self help that creates
an incentive for states to adhere to international law,98 although the
strength of that incentive varies across issue areas. In the trade
context, for example, the prospect of a state raising tariff barriers in
response to its trading partner’s restriction of imports can be a
considerable deterrent. But the threat to torture one’s own citizens as
a response to acts of torture of another state’s nationals would be
morally unthinkable as well as practically useless.99
Even where the reciprocity operates effectively, it is not
immediately apparent why states don’t simply renege on their
commitments while attempting to hide that fact and benefit from the
compliance of their treaty partners. As analyses of international
cooperation using the insights of game theory—most notably the
classic Prisoner’s Dilemma—have shown, defection by all parties
(i.e. reciprocal noncompliance) is often the equilibrium position.100
Without more, then, anarchy, rather than a legal order, would seem
to be the dominant mode of interstate relations.
Two different strands of IR theory suggest why this is not so.
The first views states as rational, self-interested (and unitary) actors
that maximize their own welfare. The puzzle for rational choice
scholars has been to explain how states acting under this set of
assumptions could move from defection to cooperation. The answer
97. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see
also John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist
International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the
Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997).
98. See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 817, 831–32 (2002).
99. Quite sensibly, the Vienna Convention excludes human rights
agreements from the agreements that may be terminated or suspended as a
consequence of another state’s breach. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6,
art. 60(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346.
100. See Setear, supra note 97, at 27–31.
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is found in international regimes and institutions which transform the
Prisoner’s Dilemma from a single play to an iterated game and use
information sharing, third party monitoring, dispute settlement, and
other tools to “lengthen the shadow of the future” so that cooperation
becomes entrenched.101 As performance records are exposed and
institutions link across issue areas, states begin to consider the
reputation costs of breaching their legal commitments. Acquiring a
reputation as a rule violator means that “other states may refuse to
enter into future agreements, demand greater concessions when
entering into such agreements, or lose faith in the strength of existing
agreements” that matter to the putative violating state.102
The second strand of IR theory focuses on norms rather than
interests. It argues that international legal rules possess a unique
persuasive pull that leads states to alter their behavior in favor of
compliance. Different strands of normative theory focus on the
legitimacy of international law, its internalization into domestic legal
systems, and designing regimes to promote a shift of preferences and
values among state actors.103 Scholars of this school are equally
concerned with identifying the causes of compliance, and have
examined the role of norm entrepreneurs and norm cascades,
transnational advocacy networks, and domestic compliance
constituencies as agents of change.104
Both rationalist and normative IR theories thus share the belief
that compliance is possible even in a decentralized legal system. Yet
101. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law:
Interests, Reputation, Institutions, 93 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 375, 378
(2000) (“Institutions that lengthen the shadow of the future or link otherwise
separate issues may create incentives to cooperate now for the sake of
promoting cooperation by others later.”).
102. Guzman, supra note 90, at 1829 n.16.
103. See Hathaway, supra note 94, at 1955–62 (reviewing normative
compliance models); see also George W. Downs et al., The Transformational
Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 465, 471 (2000) (discussing regime design).
104. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998); Judith Goldstein
& Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A
Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000); Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink,
The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights
Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001).
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the general absence of strong enforcement machinery continues to
generate disputes about the depth of cooperation such a system can
achieve. Some scholars argue that the proper response to a dearth of
enforcement is to manage compliance by nonconfrontational
measures that monitor behavior, build capacity, and resolve disputes
informally, thereby persuading states to adhere to their treaty
commitments.105 Others counter that such approaches work only
where legal commitments are shallow (that is, where they require
little change from the existing baseline of states’ conduct).106 Where
states negotiate more demanding treaty commitments, these scholars
argue, they also adopt more powerful enforcement systems, in the
absence of which cooperation is likely to break down.107
This debate brings the story full circle. In a sense, scholars of
international law and politics are deliberating the preconditions of
constitutionalism, that is, whether agreements among nation states
even amount to “law” and the circumstances under which a promise
to adhere to treaty commitments is borne out in practice. Because
the answers to these fundamental questions are still contested and
unsettled, constitutional analogies must be tempered to the
particularities of individual international regimes with different
compliance records and different enforcement mechanisms.
VI. EXIT AND ESCAPE
Another point of comparison between international and
constitutional systems concerns the rules and procedures each uses to
revise, suspend, and terminate previous commitments. A common
analytical thread these issues raise is the link between how
commitments are created and how they are ended. As explained in
greater detail below, constitutions and constitutional obligations are,
as a rule, more difficult to enter into and to exit from than treaties,108
105. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 96, at 22–28.
106. Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 408 (2000) (“Depth refers in
this context to the degree of costly change a treaty requires from the status quo
ante.”).
107. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance
Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–80 (1996).
108. More difficult, but not impossible, particularly where affected parties
can opt-out of applicable legal norms by “going private.” See Elizabeth G.
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a fact with important implications for both domestic political
structures and international cooperation.
Consider first the drafting of domestic constitutions, which often
occurs during periods of intense reflection and deliberation by
national polities over the norms, institutions, and procedures that will
control the government’s relationship to the governed. The rules
agreed to during such “constitutional moments” are deliberately
elevated above the normal political fray. The justification for
imposing such antidemocratic constraints on future majoritarian
lawmaking is the “extraordinary levels of democratic consent . . . to
the rules that will tie the hands of future governments,” including
“referenda, supermajority votes, and elected constitutional
assemblies.”109 In most instances, these higher order rules cannot be
altered by subsequent generations except by the use of comparably
exceptional procedures.110 Constitutions, in short, are designed to be
sticky precisely to deter future retrenchments away from the values
they enshrine.
Many international agreements and institutions share this
propensity for stickiness. In the human rights area, for example,
scholars have argued that governments in newly democratic states
ratify human rights treaties for many of the same reasons that they
adopt constitutions—to prevent their successors from backsliding
Stringent treaty amendment
away from democratic rule.111
Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute
Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 151 (2000) (discussing a Internet dispute
settlement mechanisms that allow private parties to contract out of public law
norms).
109. Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 24, at 237.
110. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, TEX. L. REV. 703, 798–99 (2002) (discussing amendment
procedures in U.S. Const. art. V); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51
DUKE L.J. 223, 276 n.220 (2001) (discussing amendment procedures for
German and Canadian constitutions and noting that the U.S. Constitution is
“much more difficult” to change).
111. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes:
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 228 (2000).
Given this justification for ratification, it is significant that several human
rights treaties, unlike the international agreements discussed below, do not
contain denunciation clauses. See Elizabeth Evatt, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and the ICCPR: Denunciation as an Exercise of the Right of
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procedures serve similar functions, safeguarding the compromises
reached during what are often lengthy and contentious negotiations
by permitting the parties to revisit those deals only if all (or a large
majority) of the signatories agree to do so.112 International tribunals
too can enhance the durability of intergovernmental cooperation.
Where, as with the ECJ, such tribunals interpret or augment treaty
bargains to grant rights to private parties, they create domestic
constituencies that make it politically impossible to reverse the
governments’ initial decision to cooperate.113 Still another form of
self-limitation occurs when legislators give executive officials power
to negotiate international package deals, reserving for themselves
only the right to accept or reject the treaty package as a whole.114
These examples illustrate the parallels between the hands tying
functions of treaties and those of constitutions. But the analogy
should not be overstated because in many important ways legalized
international cooperation is not a one way ratchet. To the contrary,
such cooperation occurs in the shadow of differentiated applicability
rules that, at the front end, allow states both to opt into and to opt out
of specific obligations and, at the back end, permit them to exit and
escape from their treaty commitments.115
Self-Defence?, 5 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 215, 219–20 (1999) (discussing North
Korea’s attempt to denounce the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and UN Human Rights Committee’s conclusion that the drafters of the
Covenant intended to preclude states parties from denouncing the treaty).
112. See Bernhard Boockmann & Paul W. Thurner, Flexibility Provisions in
Multilateral Environmental Treaties, Discussion Paper No. 02-44 (2002), at
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0244.pdf (survey of 400 environmental
law treaties noting their unanimity, consensus, and qualified majority voting
rules for the adoption of amendments); see also Barbara Koremenos,
Loosening the Ties That Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility, 55
INT’L ORG. 289, 309, 313 (2001) (discussing the amendment provision of
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Antarctic Treaty and concluding in the
case of the latter treaty that the contracting states “ma[de] it very difficult to
either modify or withdraw from the agreement” during its first thirty years).
113. See Weiler, supra note 15, at 2412 (discussing the “closure of selective
Exit” from the European Community by its member states).
114. See Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly
Known as Fast Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More
Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2003).
115. These differentiated treaty applicability rules are the subject of a
research agenda on “Exit, Escape, and Commitment in International
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Front end opt-ins and opt-outs come in a variety of different
stripes. The most well known opt-out mechanism is the filing of a
reservation—a document that a state appends to its ratification of a
treaty to limit or qualify the scope of its obligations.116 Many
international agreements expressly preclude states from filing
reservations to preserve the precise package of negotiated
commitments.117 But many others permit these unilateral carve outs,
subject to the overriding limitation that they do not prejudice the
object and purpose of the agreement.118
Opt-in rules are somewhat less common, but are found in
agreements supplemented through optional protocols or annexes that
allow the parties to the principal treaty text to decide if and when to
take on additional commitments.119 Other important examples are
plurilateral codes—families of treaties that require ratifying states to
accept certain treaty obligations but make others entirely
voluntarily.120 In other cases, these differentiated rules find their

Governance” that I am pursuing as a Fellow in the Program in Law and Public
Affairs at Princeton University. See Princeton Program in Law and Public
Affairs, http://www.princeton.edu/~lapa/main.html.
116. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(defining reservations). For a recent discussion of the use of reservations, see
Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insights: Reservations to Treaties and United States
Practice (May 2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh105.htm.
117. The WTO is one such agreement. See Final Act, supra note 25, art.
XVI, ¶ 5, 33 I.L.M. at 1175.
118. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Sometimes opt-out provisions are made a part of the treaty itself. See
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, done July
14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 App. (setting out a special regime of nonexclusive
compulsory licenses for developing countries that grant rights to translate or
otherwise reproduce copyrighted works needed for teaching, scholarship, or
research purposes in those countries).
119. See, e.g., Organization of American States: Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, approved June 8,
1990, 29 I.L.M. 1447; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976).
120. See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? ConsensusBased Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 357–
59 (2002) (discussing plurilateral codes adopted during the Tokyo Round of
GATT).
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expression in transition and phase-in provisions that delay the onset
of treaty obligations for certain member states but not others.121
In contrast to opt-out and opt-in rules which operate ex ante, exit
and escape mechanisms come into play after a state has ratified a
treaty. Exit mechanisms take the form of denunciation clauses that
allow any ratifying state unilaterally to withdraw from a treaty,
thereby terminating its obligations. Significantly, many of these
clauses permit denunciations for any reason or for no reason at all.
All that the withdrawing state must do is to notify the other treaty
parties of its decision, which then takes effect a short time after
notice is given.122
Somewhat less prevalent and having a less drastic effect are
escape clauses, provisions that permit states to temporarily derogate
from or suspend their treaty obligations for a specific period of time
in response to war, emergencies, or changed circumstances.123 One
121. The TRIPs Agreement’s phase in rules for developing and least
developed WTO members provide a notable example.
See Helfer,
Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 34, at 431.
122. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, art. XXIV, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1116,
993 U.N.T.S. 243, 257, (“Any Party may denounce the present Convention by
written notification . . . [to] take effect twelve months after the Depositary
Government has received the notification.”); International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. XI, para. 1, 62 Stat. 1716, 1721
(providing that any party may withdraw by written notification to the
depositary government on or before January 1 of a given year, with withdrawal
effective on June 30 of that year). Some treaties prohibit denunciations until
they have been in force for a particular length of time. See European
Convention, supra note 85, art. 65(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 252 (providing that,
after the Convention has been in force for five years, any party may withdraw
by written notification to the Secretary-General of Council of Europe, with
withdrawal effective six months after such notice). Others set out substantive
standards that limit withdrawals, but allow the withdrawing state to decide
whether those standards have been met. See Treaty on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XV(2), 23 U.S.T.
3435, (“Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.”)
(emphasis added). Still other agreements qualify, condition, or, occasionally,
preclude exit altogether. See Evatt, supra note 111, at 219–20.
123. See B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of
International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L ORG. 829,
830 (2001) (defining “escape clauses” of international agreements as “any
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important example of such an escape mechanism is the Agreement
on Safeguards, a treaty that specifies the conditions under which a
WTO member can suspend its free trade commitments under the
GATT in response to economic shocks.124 A very different example
is found in human rights agreements, which permit states to derogate
from the protection of certain individual liberties during times of
public emergency.125
These examples suggest that exit and escape clauses are an
important aspect of treaty design along with other “risk
management” tools such as reservations, amendment procedures,
dispute settlement clauses, and specification of standards of review
to be applied by international tribunals.126 But the existence of such
clauses says nothing about whether states will in fact invoke them.127
Although there have been a number of high profile derogations and
suspensions in recent years,128 international cooperation would be
provision[s] of an international agreement that allow[] a country to suspend the
concessions it previously negotiated without violating or abrogating the terms
of the agreement”).
124. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, in FINAL ACT
EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, at 1 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm.
125. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José,
Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 152 (entered into
force July 18, 1978) (identifying limited emergency situations in which
ratifying states may derogate from their treaty obligations but also listing rights
from which no derogation is permitted).
126. See RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT 23–77 (1981) (identifying a suite of general risk management
techniques in treaties).
127. From an instrumentalist perspective, a state will choose to exit or
escape from its treaty commitments if benefits of denunciation or derogation
outweigh the costs. That cost benefit calculation is likely to vary widely.
Denunciations of agreements, such as those creating the WTO and the EU,
which link different substantive obligations into multi-issue packages
supported by broad cross sections of domestic interest groups, create
significant costs and thus are unlikely to occur.
128. See Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 93, at 1881–82
(discussing denunciation of human rights agreements by Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad & Tobago); Charles Hutzler, U.S. Presses U.N. to Act Quickly on
North Korea: Washington Sees the Need for Security Council Role in Halting
Nuclear Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at A16 (discussing North Korea’s
withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty); New Zealand Opposes
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impossible if states habitually walked away from their treaty
obligations. Yet exit and escape mechanisms, if appropriately
constrained, can serve several useful functions.
Exit can be a valid response to changed circumstances arising
after ratification or to jurisprudential shifts that cause treaty
commitments to become overlegalized.129 Where states periodically
negotiate revisions to treaties, exit clauses can increase bargaining
power by allowing states to threaten to leave the regime if at least
some of their demands are not met.130 Exit can also function as the
ultimate check on international institutions, allowing states to
influence their actions and, if necessary, create alternative
organizations that better serve their interests.131 Finally, exit may
actually be a superior response from the perspective of respect for
Iceland Bid to Re-enter Whaling Body, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 24, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 2787030 (discussing Iceland’s withdrawal and
subsequent readmission to International Whaling Commission); Kate
O’Hanlon, Detention of Suspected International Terrorists Not Incompatible
with Human Rights, INDEP. (London) Oct. 29, 2002, at 18 (discussing the
United Kingdom’s derogation from article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights, to detain foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists); Eliza
Patterson, ASIL Insights: The US Provides Section 201 Relief for the American
Steel Industry (Mar. 2002), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh84.htm
(analyzing temporary increase in tariffs on imports of certain steel products to
protect US steel industry). A related phenomenon is the United States decision
to “unsign” the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. See
Curtis A. Bradley, ASIL Insights: U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify
International Criminal Court Treaty (May 2002), at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh87.htm.
129. See Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 93, at 1891–94
(discussing denunciation of human rights treaties by three Commonwealth
Caribbean governments in response to changes in legalization levels brought
about by interactions between international tribunals and a domestic court).
130. See Steinberg, supra note 120, at 348–49 (discussing different ways in
which powerful countries use threats of exit to achieve their negotiating
objectives).
131. See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of
Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 154, 155 (1995) (the
creation of a new, rival institution can be viewed as “an institutional release
mechanism” that compensates for the inability of an existing institution to alter
its position); cf. Stephan, supra note 20, at 693 (stating that “individual
members may threaten to resort to the exit option to rein in” the bureaucracy of
an intergovernmental organization).

HELFER_PRINTER READY (022804)

Fall 2003]

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALOGIES

8/2/2004 3:08 PM

231

law, where the alternative is to publicly profess adherence but fail to
comply in fact.
Escape mechanisms too can have beneficial uses. They allow
states to commit to deeper levels of cooperation ex ante while
preserving the flexibility to respond ex post to temporary external
shocks and pressures from domestic interest groups—events that
might overwhelm more constraining treaty commitments and force
governments to revise or exit from the treaty. But not all escape
clauses are created equal. The critical issue is to design optimal
penalties or constraints that allow efficient uses of escape clauses
while deterring opportunism.132
Taken together, these differentiated applicability rules reinforce
the notion that treaties—whatever their putative normative force—
continue to be conditioned upon the formal consent of states, which
is precisely calibrated and can even be suspended or withdrawn if
compliance is no longer in their interest. This aspect of treaty design
is decidedly unlike constitutions, which articulate rules that apply
with equal force to all similarly situated individuals and which
generally do not envision the possibility of unilateral withdrawal by
specific domestic polities. Yet, the fact that treaties are sometimes
used to tie the hands of domestic political actors and that states
invoke exit clauses only rarely suggests that international
cooperation is not simply an illusion and that it is possible to draw
appropriately limited parallels between international governance
structures and constitutions.
VII. EMERGING CHALLENGES: DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY
International organizations that are weak or simply mirror
domestic political preferences often go unnoticed or at least
unchallenged. But when these entities regulate subjects at the core of
132. See Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 123, at 845–52; Alan O. Sykes,
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 297 (1991).
See also Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy,
Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1555, 1583 (1999) (“[H]ow can we distinguish a nation’s principled
assertion of a right to withdraw from a relationship that has turned out badly
from an opportunistic attempt to appropriate benefits that were created for a
collective good?”).
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national law and policy, critics begin to question their authority and
the anti-democratic character of their actions.133 Stated another way,
it is precisely when international agreements and institutions start to
matter that challenges to their democratic pedigree and legitimacy
become more prevalent and more trenchant.
The potential for a nexus to constitutional law should be
obvious. Democracy and legitimacy concerns are the bread and
butter of constitutional discourse. The specific mechanisms for
addressing these concerns may differ from country to country and
from constitution to constitution. But the common thread that
connects the creators and interpreters of constitutions in different
jurisdictions is the need to resolve questions of power and
governance. These questions include deciding what procedures
elected or representative institutions must use to create binding rules
of general applicability, how those institutions are held accountable
for their actions to the relevant political communities, questions of
delegation and separation of powers, and when normal rules of
majoritarian decision making should be constrained in the service of
higher order principles and values. In short, as democracy and
legitimacy concerns become a more important focus of international
governance, the analogies to domestic constitutions acquire greater
allure.
The literature on democracy and legitimacy-based critiques of
treaties and institutions is rich and extensive, and, not surprisingly,
focuses mainly on the EU and WTO. Commentators analyzing these
two institutions and predicting the future of other international
bodies have identified several overlapping strands of democratic
difficulties, each of which generates a different prescription for

133. Although “legitimacy” and “democracy” are central concerns of
constitutional law and now international law scholars, there is surprisingly
little consensus as to their meanings. For a detailed discussion and collection
of alternative definitions of legitimacy, see Bodansky, supra note 10, at 600–
03. For a helpful definition of democracy, see Keohane & Nye, supra note 30,
at 281 (“Democracy is government by officials who are accountable to the
majority of the people in a jurisdiction, albeit with frequent provisions for
supermajority voting and protections for individuals and minorities.”).
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reform. These critiques can be roughly divided into deficiencies of
process and deficiencies of outcome.134
Among the more numerous process critiques, commentators
have focused in particular on participation and transparency issues.
From a traditional international law perspective, participation begins
and ends with the state’s decision to ratify a treaty or become a
member of an intergovernmental organization. Such formalism no
longer satisfies most critics, many of whom draw upon the core
insight of liberal IR scholars that nation states must be disaggregated
into their constituent parts.135 Once the state is no longer treated as a
unitary entity, the true democratic difficulty emerges: the attenuated
links and diffuse connections between international institutions on
the one hand and national elected officials and the electorate itself on
the other.136
Prescriptions for enhancing participation occupy a wide range of
positions along a continuum from the incremental to the utopian, and
separately target adjudication, treaty negotiations, and rulemaking
functions. In the trade context, one modest proposal seeks to open
the doors of dispute settlement chambers (and perhaps negotiating
halls) to input from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
134. See Atik, supra note 28, at 453–54 (drawing this distinction). See also
Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 282 (“Democratic governments are judged
both on the procedures they follow (inputs) and on the results they obtain
(outputs).”); Raustialia, supra note 45, at 410 (identifying the two facets of the
democracy problem in international law as “generativity”—meaning the
“ability of international institutions to produce new substantive rules that
modify or extend a given legal agreement”—and “insularity”—meaning “both
the degree of transparency and of non-executive branch (for example,
legislative/public) participation in the international institution and its
decisions”).
135. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 513 (1997); see also
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 240, 241 (2000) (stating that characteristics of liberal theory
include its bottom-up view, its linking of the international and domestic
spheres, its rendering of state-society relations as transparent, and its
transformation of states into governments).
136. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 276 (noting that critics of
intergovernmental organizations such as the WTO have challenged the “closed
clubs indirectly linked to popular demands by long and opaque chains of
delegation”).
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other non-state actors.137 Further along the spectrum are efforts to
grant private parties affected by a state’s violation of its treaty
commitments the right to assert claims before WTO dispute
settlement institutions which are now open only to member states.138
Such proposals emulate the approach of other intergovernmental
organizations and international tribunals, many of which already
permit various forms of participation by or grant standing to
individuals and members of civil society.139
Other observers believe more radical reforms are required, such
as (1) holding direct elections to newly created international
legislatures (an institutional innovation that at present exists only in
the EU’s European Parliament); (2) authorizing national
parliamentarians to serve on international legislative bodies; and (3)
granting voting or participation rights to affected private individuals

137. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation
in the WTO, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 433 (1998); Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated”
Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957 (1996).
138. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
295 (1996); Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution:
Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 587 (1998).
139. With respect to participation in treaty negotiations, compare
Convention on Biological Diversity, The Convention on Biological Diversity
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs): Relationships and Synergies, Oct. 5, 1996, UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23 ¶
53, stating that NGOs “may not participate as observers or in any fashion
whatsoever in any proceedings of . . . the WTO,” with Food or Famine—
Three Words Will Determine Our Future: Civil Society Groups Fear a New
Global Convention Governing the Genes of the Major Food Crops Will Not Be
Fair, Equitable, or Comprehensive, ITDG, at http://www.ukabc.org/
threelitlewords.doc (“Over 400 civil society groups from 70 countries have
lobbied the negotiators of [the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture].”). Human rights tribunals and NAFTA chapter 11
dispute settlement panels are just two examples of international adjudication
mechanisms that allow individuals and firms to bring suits directly against
states. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s
Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 51–87 (2003) (reviewing
recent case law and legitimacy challenges to NAFTA’s investor-state dispute
settlement system); Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note 47, at 296-301
(reviewing UN and regional human rights petition systems).
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and interest groups.140 These proposals have, in turn, been critiqued
on the ground that, in the absence of any international political
community, “the extension of domestic voting practices to the world
scale would make little normative sense, even if it were feasible.”141
Yet if increasing the electoral accountability of international
institutions is not a viable option, what alternatives remain? For
some, the critical issue is enhancing transparency. Here, too,
proposals range widely, from opening closed judicial and lawmaking
venues, to granting observer status to intergovernmental
organizations, NGOs, and other private parties, to soliciting public
comment on institutional activities, and to publishing documents and
studies on the internet.142

140. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, From ‘Negative’ to ‘Positive’
Integration in the WTO: Time for ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ into WTO
Law?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (2000) (proposing the
establishment of an advisory WTO Economic and Social Committee composed
of civil society representatives and an advisory “parliamentary body”); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 398, 431 (1997) (calling for national legislatures and
civil society groups to seek a new initiative within the WTO to strengthen
individual rights, constitutional safeguards and more representative
institutions); see also Atik, supra note 28, at 468–71 (reviewing proposals for
broadening participation in decision making of intergovernmental
organizations).
141. Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 283. The truth of this insight is
buttressed by the failed attempt to hold global, online elections for the public
board members of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), a private, non-national regulatory body. See Laurence R. Helfer,
International Dispute Settlement at the Trademark-Domain Name Interface, 29
PEPP. L. REV. 87, 98 (2001) (asserting that is premature to consider ICANN
“as anything even approaching a global cyberspace parliament, given the many
challenges to its legitimacy . . . and the paucity of voters in recent elections to
the ICANN Board”).
142. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 30, at 277–78 (reviewing proposals);
Stein, supra note 3, at 531–34 (reviewing proposals). There is good reason to
question whether the use of digital media to make documents publicly
available or even to allow direct public commentary is sufficient, in itself, to
provide a plurality of views to international lawmakers or to avoid the capture
of the lawmaking process by special interests. See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra
note 46, at 169 nn.85–87 (stating that “formal transparency in theory cannot
ensure broad-based participation in fact” and citing in support articles and
position by Professor Michael Froomkin critiquing online public consultations
held by the World Intellectual Property Organization concerning the creation
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Increased transparency has dangers as well as benefits, however.
It is often the closed nature of the proceedings that enables
government officials to make the tradeoffs necessary to conclude
treaty negotiations or allows litigating parties to reach a mutually
satisfactory settlement. The effect of greater openness may,
paradoxically, be a diminution in the efficacy of international
cooperation or adjudication, a result that exacerbates a different type
of democracy and legitimacy challenge to treaties and
intergovernmental organizations.
Commentators who stress the latter type of shortcoming target
their criticism at the outcomes of international lawmaking and
dispute settlement—that is, at deficiencies in the principles, norms,
or rules that international regimes generate. In some cases, the
problem is one of ineffectiveness—an institution that has not
achieved the goals set forth in its founding charter or established by
its member states. In other instances, the difficulty is one of proper
balance, with one institution or another said to be biased in favor of
particular substantive values.143
Strategies for ameliorating these substantive democracy deficits
raise considerable challenges. On the one hand, achieving greater
efficacy may require granting additional authority to international
institutions and their staff, a result that would be anathema to states
that jealously guard their sovereignty. Yet in the absence of such
independent authority, it may be difficult or impossible to begin the
slow process of modifying the preferences of national actors that
deeper international cooperation often requires. Resolving problems
of actual or perceived institutional bias are equally challenging. One
might seek to dilute normative partiality by directing reforms at a
single influential organization, such as by altering the mix of
expertise possessed by its bureaucrats or by expanding its
competence to address a broader range of substantive issue areas (as
discussed in connection with the WTO above). A very different
response would seek to enhance the powers of those
of a new non-national dispute settlement system to resolve cybersquatting
claims between trademark owners and domain name registrants).
143. See Frank J. Garcia, Building a Just Trade Order for a New
Millennium, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1015, 1059 (2000); Philip M.
Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 709–18 (1996).
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intergovernmental organizations whose principles, norms, or rules
are being trenched upon by more powerful rival institutions. Yet
whether states will agree to cede to such organizations the authority
that such a strategy requires remains a contentious and unresolved
question.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a brief exploration of nascent
analogies between domestic constitutions and the international legal
system, identifying institutions and issue areas for which
constitutional analogies have greater salience, and comparing them
to those for which such analogies have less purchase. The Article
has also examined constitutional trends that are beginning to emerge
outside of the nation state by focusing on five structural and systemic
challenges that the international legal system now faces. Although
the analogies between domestic constitutions and treaty regimes are
inexact, they may nevertheless help to generate insights for
international legal scholars and political scientists seeking to explain
recent changes to international law and institutions and to predict
their future trajectories.
Scholars considering the next phase in this project should
undertake more fine-grained comparisons of specific institutions or
issues areas in which constitutional analogies seem to hold the most
promise for enhancing international cooperation. Although the
translation of legal norms from one system to another is often fraught
with danger,144 careful comparative analysis may help state and
nonstate actors operating within international regimes to learn from
national constitutional experiences, adapting or even enhancing their
benefits while avoiding their mistakes.

144. See generally Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International
Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994).

